Nearly a quarter of a century ago, I was a young, naïve, and foolish believer in an economic concept known as rational expectations -an elegant, mathematically beautiful theory with no practical use. In Star Wars parlance, I had effectively been seduced by the dark side. Thankfully, several of my university lecturers were determined to save me from this terrible fate. They insisted on teaching me a very wide variety of approaches to economics including the Marxist perspective and the something known as post-Keynesian macro. I owe them a huge debt of gratitude.
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Profi t Margins as a Case in Point
Today I fi nd myself once again digging through this toolkit, searching for a way to understand the development of profi t margins. Currently, U.S. profi t margins are at record highs according to the NIPA data (see Exhibit 1). More freakish still is that these record high profi t margins are coming during the weakest economic recovery in post-war history.
At GMO, we are fi rm believers in mean reversion, and as such record elevation in profi t margins causes us much consternation. Of course, we are constantly on the lookout for sound arguments as to why we might be wrong in our assumption of margin reversion. After all, believers in mean reversion are always short a structural break, and such a break clearly matters. For instance, Exhibit 2 shows that in simple trailing P/E terms the U.S. market isn't actually expensive. However, the P/E is only one part of a valuation -it also depends upon the state of earnings. It is the margin component that is dragging our return forecast down. If we are incorrect on our assumption of mean reversion in profi t margins, then our forecast radically alters. For instance, if instead of falling to 6% over the next 7 years margins stayed at today's levels, our forecast would be closer to 4.5% p.a.
Clearly the fi rst two elements of Exhibit 2 are all about cyclical adjustment: we are assuming that the market goes to a "normal" P/E based on "normal" E. Therefore, it is no surprise that we see the same point from a different perspective when we look at a comparison of the simple trailing P/E using the Graham and Dodd P/E (Exhibit 3). The latter tries to smooth out the business cycle's impact upon earnings by using a 10-year moving average of earnings. Hence, differences between the two measures are a statement of how far earnings are from their "trend." The simple trailing P/E is around 15x and the Graham and Dodd P/E is around 24x, again highlighting the divergence of profi ts from their long-run normal levels.
Whilst we at GMO fret over evidence of the strained nature of profi t margins, the ever bullish Wall Street analysts expect profi t margins to continue to rise! Witness Exhibit 4. In our search for evidence of a structural break, this simple-minded extrapolation gives us some comfort because the Wall Street consensus has a pretty good record of being completely and utterly wrong. 
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Macro Drivers of Profi ts
In order to explore what Alan Greenspan would no doubt have referred to as the profi t margin "conundrum," we need to use a framework rarely taught, I fear, in universities these days. It goes by the name of the Kalecki profi ts equation.
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Kalecki was a Polish economist and a contemporary of Keynes. In fact it transpires that the Kalecki profi ts equation was discovered at least three times, fi rst by Jerome Levy a decade prior to Kalecki, then by Keynes and Kalecki in the 1930s.
Kalecki's derivation was perhaps the easiest to understand. He used the fl ow of funds framework and national income accounting to ground his understanding of profi ts.
As an example let's take the simplest economy from a macroeconomic perspective, one in which there is no government and no external trade (a private, closed economy in the language of economists). 3 In such an economy, total income must equal total expenditure.
Income = Expenditure
If income can be partitioned into profi ts and wages, and expenditures can be split between investment and consumption, then we have:
Profi ts + Wages = Investment + Consumption Rearranging this gives us:
Profi ts = Investment + Consumption -Wages Assuming no income is distributed to households from the corporate sector (i.e., no dividends), household savings can be defi ned as:
Household Savings = Wages -Consumption Inserting this into the profi ts equation we now get:
Profi ts = Investment -Household Savings This is, of course, an identity -a truism by construction. However, it can be interpreted with some causality imposed. After all, profi ts are a residual; they are the remainder after the factors of production have been paid. Thus it can comfortably be argued that the left-hand side of the equation is determined by the right-hand side.
The equation can be generalized to an economy that does have a government sector and in which international trade occurs, and in which the corporate sector does pay some of its profi ts to the household sector. To spare the reader from potentially terminal boredom, I will skip the derivation (to a collective sigh of relief no doubt) and merely present the following: 4 Profi ts = Investment -Household Savings -Government Savings -Foreign Savings + Dividends Let's briefl y examine the logic behind these drivers of profi ts. Investment (technically, investment net of depreciation) drives profi ts because when a fi rm or a household decides to invest in some real asset they are effectively buying the good from another fi rm, creating profi ts for that entity. Remember that this is aggregate; any single fi rm (even the 2 For those who have attended the GMO client conferences in the last couple of years, this is the framework that Ben Inker has used to explore profit margins. 3 One of my colleagues pointed out that this is a bit "wonkish," so I've made an attempt to make the profits equation a little more intuitive in the appendix. 4 For those interested in learning more about the profits equation and its derivation, I would suggest reading "Where Do Profits Come From," by Levy, Farnham, and Rajan (1997) world's largest) is minuscule relative to the total amount of investment that occurs, so it isn't possible for any given fi rm to bootstrap itself into profi tability via investment.
Household savings are a drag on profi ts. This should be fairly obvious. Wages are paid by corporates to households, forming income from the household perspective. If some of this is saved, it is clearly not recycled into spending and, hence, is lost from the corporates' year-by-year profi ts point of view.
Just like the household sector, government sector savings are a drag on profi ts. There are many transmission mechanisms between the government sector and the business sector, some reducing profi ts, some increasing profi ts. There is the tax route, whereby personal income tax reduces the amount of profi ts available to the business sector. Conversely, the government is also an employer, paying its employees who in turn spend and create profi ts. Plus, of course, there is direct interaction between the government sector and the business sector when the government is buying goods and services. All of these interactions (plus others) can be summarized into the government sector savings.
Foreign savings (also known as the current account balance) are also a drag on profi ts. Remember that the current account balance measures the amount that the U.S. owes to the rest of world (in terms of both actual goods and services purchased and investment fl ows) minus the amount that the rest of the world owes to the U.S. (again in terms of payments for goods and services and investment fl ows). If the U.S. is running a current account defi cit, then it owes the rest of the world, and this is lost potential profi ts from the perspective of the domestic business sector.
Finally, we have dividends. This may seem like a counterintuitive source of profi ts since these are paid out by the business sector to households. However, from the perspective of the household sector, these are a form of income, which can be spent, thereby creating profi ts for the business sector.
With this brief tour of the drivers of macro profi ts complete, we are now in a position to see how the various sources have interacted to generate the profi ts we have actually witnessed. This decomposition is shown graphically in Exhibit 5. Even a cursory glance at the exhibit reveals that net investment has generally been the biggest driver of corporate profi tability over time. However, the stand-out engine of corporate profi ts of late has been the fi scal defi cit. To further highlight this dependence of profi ts upon the fi scal defi cit, Exhibit 6 shows the breakdown of profi ts during 2011. The massive impact that the fi scal defi cit has had becomes immediately clear. Government savings have a negative effect on profi ts; a fi scal defi cit is just negative government savings, hence the double minus sign in the table below.
Exhibit 5 U.S. Corporate Profit Margins and Their Macro-Drivers
Prognosis for Profi ts: Not a Pretty Picture
Not only can the profi ts equation help us understand the drivers of past performance, but it can also help us frame the likely outlook for margins. Corporate investment may increase slightly from today's levels, but to really surge would require a strong economic recovery and the return of Keynes's infamous animal spirits. Leading economic indicators don't suggest that this is currently on the horizon. Likewise, the housing starts data suggests that housing investment is likely to be essentially fl at.
The government defi cit may stay high this year, due largely to it being an election year. However, it is almost unthinkable that it will remain at current levels over the course of the next few years. As such, unless households start to re-leverage or the current account improves signifi cantly, and assuming that the government moves toward some form of defi cit reduction plan, corporate profi ts are likely to struggle. From this perspective, a structural break in profi t margins looks to be diffi cult to support. So, for the time being we will continue to base our forecasts on the mean reversion of profi t margins.
Not Just the U.S.
Of course, exceptionally high profi t margins are not the sole province of the U.S. European, U.K., and Japanese margins are all high relative to their own historical averages. Like the U.S., they will be subject to the same drivers of profi ts at the macro level.
In Japan, we fi nd a situation where the household sector is saving very little, there is a current account surplus, and the government is running a massive fi scal defi cit. On these grounds, one would expect Japanese profi t margins to be soaring. However, this isn't what we fi nd. As Exhibit 7 shows, Japanese profi t margins have been far below those seen in other nations. Given the massive tailwinds listed above, this can really only imply that net investment must have been massively negative (effectively, depreciation has outstripped any new investment). One can only ponder just how appalling Japanese profi t margins would have been without all of the government help over the last two decades! Of course, if net investment were to turn positive (or even stop being quite so negative), then Japan could witness a marked improvement in margins. In the U.K., the situation is very similar to that of the United States. However, the government is trying its hand at austerity, with an aim to reduce the government defi cit by 8% of GDP by 2016/17. Of course, this is easier said than done because it requires other sectors to take up the slack (see Footnote 1). As with the U.S., the household sector is likely to be in deleveraging mode for some time, and a surge in net investment looks unlikely against this weak demand backdrop. Hence, it is likely to be that profi t margins will have to fall.
Europe is likely to provide its usual mixed picture. Those nations that embark upon austerity (think the periphery) are likely to see their profi t margins collapse (alongside their economies), creating a double whammy for the corporate sector.
Conclusions
To us, the macro profi ts equation is a simple but powerful tool for understanding the drivers of profi ts, and helps us assess their sustainability. It is a useful organizing framework for thinking about the possibility of a structural break in profi t margins. When we look at the drivers of today's high profi t margins, we fi nd fi scal defi cits behind the high profi t margins of many countries. There is nothing "wrong" with this per se, but it does suggest that moves toward fi scal retrenchment will bring margins back toward more normal levels. It seems unlikely that "this time is different" when it comes to mean reversion in margins: what goes up must come down.
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